Based on an extended model of endogenous directed technical change and on cross-country data, we identify and quantify the long-run link between: (i) the technology structure (high-versus low-tech sectors) and the skill structure (highversus low-skilled workers), by considering an explicit role for the (potential) gross complementarity between technological goods; (ii) the Tobin-q and the technology characteristics of the rms through their impact on economic growth. Our estimation and calibration exercise suggests the existence of a moderate degree of gross complementarity and of an elastic relationship between the Tobin-q and key technology parameters.
and technology characteristics of the rms (e.g., Chan et al., 1990; Connolly and Hirschey, 2005) . Moreover, by gathering data for a number of European countries between 1995 and 2007, 1 we nd that there is a positive relationship between the technology structure (regarding both the number of rms and production in high-vis-à-vis low-tech manufacturing sectors) and both the skill premium and the skill structure (the latter being measured as the ratio of high-to low-skilled manufacturing workers). In particular, we infer from this evidence that the skill structure featuring a higher proportion of high-skilled workers is associated with technological change directed towards the high-tech sectors, given the observed positive elasticity of the technology structure regarding the skill structure.
In the light of these facts, this paper develops an extended directed technological change model of endogenous growth that integrates a number of key ingredients. Firstly, the model incorporates endogenous directed technical change, such that nal-goods production uses We also consider simultaneously vertical and horizontal R&D. Under our R&D specication, the choice between vertical (increase of product quality) and horizontal innovation (creation of new products and industries) is related to the allocation of R&D expenditures, which are fully endogenous. Therefore, we endogenise the rate of growth along both the vertical and the horizontal direction, and thereby the number of industries/rms in each sector.
3 Given the distinct nature of vertical and horizontal innovation (immaterial versus physical) and the consequent asymmetry in terms of R&D complexity costs, this framework then makes economic growth and rm dynamics closely related: vertical R&D is the ultimate growth engine, while horizontal R&D builds an explicit link between aggregate and technology-structure variables (the number of rms and production in high-and in low-tech sectors). Finally, the model features two additional assumptions: (i) we allow for an interaction between the quantity of one intermediate good and the marginal productivity of the other intermediate goods, such that gross substitutability or gross complementarity may arise between the intermediate goods used in the production of nal goods; (ii) we include internal investment costs à la Hayashi (1982) (e.g., Benavie et al., 1996; Thompson, 2008) . Therefore, the model establishes a relationship between the technology structure and the skill structure regulated by the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity between technological goods (i.e., intermediate goods), together with a relationship between the Tobin-q and the technology characteristics of the rms. By solving the model for the balanced-growth path (BGP), we uncover the analytical mechanism that explains the cross-country behaviour of the technological structure. Two types of eects exist: the market-size eect, through which a higher proportion of high-skilled workers 1 The Appendix provides further details on the data.
2 According to the data for the average of the European Union (27 countries), 30.9% of the employment in the high-tech manufacturing sectors is high-skilled (college graduates), against 12.1% of the employment in the low-tech manufacturing sectors (see the Appendix for more details on the data).
3 An alternative approach in the literature assumes that the allocation of resources between vertical and horizontal R&D implies a division of labour between the two types of R&D. Since the total labour level is determined exogenously, the rate of growth along the horizontal direction is exogenous, i.e., the BGP ow of new products and industries occurs at the same rate as (or is proportional to) population growth.
induces technological change directed towards the high-tech sectors, and the skill-premium eect, reecting the absolute productivity advantage of high-skilled workers. However, the interaction between the quantity of one technological good and the marginal productivity of the other technological goods plays a crucial role here. In particular, goods must be either gross substitutes or gross complements with the degree of complementarity below a certain threshold such that the elasticity of the technology structure with respect to the skill structure is positive, as observed in the cross-country data. That is, the increased incentives for allocating resources to R&D activities that come from gross complementarity must not be too large to oset the technological-knowledge bias channel. It is noteworthy that no upper limit seems to arise in related models featuring complementarites (e.g., Evans et al., 1998; Jones and Williams, 2000; Thompson, 2008) .
Next, we take our model to the data and quantitatively associate the empirical facts on the technology structure and the skill structure to the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity between technological goods. In particular, we are interested in checking whether the case of gross complementarity, which features as a key assumption in a signicant strand of the theoretical literature that studies poverty traps, growth and business cycles (e.g., Matsuyama, 1995; Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996; Evans et al., 1998), has empirical support.
Based on the analytical BGP relationships derived in the model and on the cross-country data for the technology structure and the skill structure, we compute indirect estimates of the value of the parameter that regulates the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity.
Our results show that this parameter has a condence interval between 1.08 and 1.78. Since the estimates are, in any case, larger than unity, our identication and estimation exercise suggests that there is gross complementarity between technological goods, thus backing up the complementarity assumption appearing in the referred to theoretical literature. However, our empirical results also suggest that the values that the literature tends to use to calibrate the complementarity parameter are apparently too high. We are also interested in the long-run relationship between the Tobin-q and both the degree of complementarity between technology goods and the complexity eect pertaining to horizontal R&D, through the impact of the last two factors on the long-run economic growth rate.
To obtain quantitative results, we calibrate the model bearing in mind the previous estimation exercise. Our results conrm the strong relationship between the Tobin-q and the R&D and technology characteristics of the rms that has been frequently reported by the empirical literature (e.g., Chan et al., 1990; Hall, 1999; Connolly and Hirschey, 2005) . Nevertheless, our estimation and calibration exercise also underscores the importance of distinguishing between the technological determinants of the long-run market value of capital and explicitly considering their interaction, in as much as it may signicantly dampen or enhance the impact on the Tobin-q.
The remainder of this work is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic generalequilibrium model of directed technological change with vertical and horizontal R&D, internal costly investment and gross substitutability/complementarity between the intermediate goods. In Sections 3 and 4, we derive the general equilibrium and analyse the BGP properties. In Section 5, we take the model to the data and quantitatively associate the empirical facts on the technology structure and the skill structure to the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity, and also quantify the long-run relationship between the Tobin-q and the technology characteristics of the rms. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. Then successful R&D introduces, through creative destruction and variety expansion, both internal and external industry-wide limits to market power and generates endogenous economic growth. Thus, the model is an extension of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) , augmented with vertical R&D, as introduced in Afonso (2006) . Moreover, with the purpose of introducing internal costly investment, we assume that nal-good producers incur a Hayashi's (1982) investment cost when accumulating total capital, which is composed by physical capital and technological-knowledge capital (i.e., capital accumulated through R&D). We also allow for an interaction between the quantity of one intermediate good and the marginal productivity of the other intermediate goods, such that gross complementarities may arise between the intermediate goods used in the production of nal goods, as in, e.g., Evans et al. (1998) and Jones and Williams (2000) . We will refer to intermediate goods also as technological goods, in the sense that they are the ones that embody successful R&D results.
The economy is populated by a xed number of innitely-lived households who maximise lifetime utility, which depends on consumption, bearing in mind the income generated by the supply one of two types of labour to nal-good rms low-skilled, L, and high-skilled labour, H (wages) and by the ownership of rms (interest).
Consumption side
The economy consists of a xed number of identical and innitely-lived households and has a zero population growth. Indexed with a ∈ [0, 1] depending on their ability level, households consume nal goods, own rms (equity) and inelastically supply low-skilled, L a (if a ≤ a), or high-skilled labour, H a (if a > a) to nal-good rms. Thus, total labour supply, L + H, is exogenous and constant, with L =´a 0 L a da and H =´1 a H a da. All households have identical preferences and perfect foresight concerning the technological change over time, and they choose the time path of nal-good consumption to maximise discounted lifetime utility:
subject to the ow budget constraint:
(with m = L if a ≤ a and m = H if a > a ), where σ > 0 is the relative risk aversion coecient, 0 < ρ < 1 is the subjective discount rate, r(t) is the market real interest rate, W m (t) is the real wage, C a (t) is the consumption of the representative household a and B a denotes the household's real equity holdings. The initial level of wealth, B a (0), is given and the non-Ponzi games condition lim t→∞ e −´t 0 r(s)ds B a (t) ≥ 0 is imposed.
The optimal consumption path is given by the standard Euler equation:
which is independent from a, and the transversality condition is lim t→∞ B a (t)e −ρt = 0. Along the balanced-growth path (BGP), withĊ /C constant , r will also be constant.
Production side
Final-good rms: production The composite nal-good, Y , is produced by competitive nal-good rms continuously indexed by n ∈ [0, 1], such that Y (t) =´1 0 P (n, t)Y (n, t)dn, where P (n, t) and Y (n, t) are the relative price and the quantity of the nal good produced by rm n. 
where: x m (n, j m , t) represents the quantity of the intermediate good j m , m = L, H, and variables H(n) and L(n) denote the amount of high-and low-skilled labour used to produce the nal good n at time t; variables A H (t) and A L (t) represent the measure of variety of H-and L-specic intermediate goods available at time t; λ > 1 reects the improvement in the quality of an intermediate good j brought in by vertical innovation, and k indicates both the number of quality improvements and the top quality rung at time t; h > l ≥ 1 reects the absolute productivity advantage of high-over low-skilled labour, while terms n and (1 − n) reect the relative productivity advantage of each labour type, implying that high-skilled labour is relatively more productive for manufacturing nal goods indexed by larger ns and vice versa; terms (1 − α) and α, with 0 < α < 1, denote the share of labour and intermediate goods in production; and φ regulates the relationship between the quantity of one intermediate good and the marginal productivity of the other intermediate goods in the production function. We impose γ = α/φ to ensure constant returns to scale, whereas φ > α is required to guarantee that the model generates positive endogenous growth, as we will show below. If φ > 1, then there is gross complementarity between intermediate goods used in production, in the sense that an increase in the quantity of one intermediate good increases the marginal productivity of the other intermediate goods. The terms n and (1 − n) imply that at each time t there exists an endogenous threshold n, at which switching from one production technology to another becomes advantageous, and consequently, each nal good n is produced with one technology = H or L = exclusively.
Operating in a perfect competition environment, each nal-good rm n seeks to maximise its prots at time t, taking as given P (n, t), the prices of the intermediate goods j m , p m (j m , t), and the wages of high-or low-skilled labour employed in production, W m (t), m = L, H,:
Note that, since each nal-good rm produces exclusively with one type of technology, prots at each t are maximized with respect to x m (n, j m , t). Then, from the rst-order conditions of each nal-producer type's maximization problem, we can derive the inverse demand functions for L-and H -specic intermediate goods used in nal goods production:
spectively, and substituting in equation (3), nal-good output for rm n can be re-written as:
where, as we will further show, p L (j L , t) and p H (j H , t) are equal, thus allowing us to place it in front of the brackets, and Q H (t) and Q L (t) are aggregate quality indices denoting the technological-knowledge stock at t for the H -and L-technology group respectively, being dened by:
The term ε ≡ (φ − 1) / (1 − α) in (5) Final-good rms: investment Final-good producers are end-users of the stock of technological knowledge and of physical capital, in as much as these stocks are embodied in the intermediate goods. Indeed, in line with Romer (1990) and others, the production of one unit of each intermediate good j m takes one unit of physical capital, i.e.,
computed from (4). Thus, the aggregate physical capital stock is the total quantity of the various types of intermediate goods, Following Thompson (2008) , we assume that nal-good producers incur a Hayashi's (1982) investment cost when accumulating total capital, which is composed by physical capital and technological knowledge (i.e., capital accumulated through R&D). Total investment,Ż (t), is then given by the sum of investment in physical capital,K (t), and investment in vertical, R v,m (t), and horizontal, R h,m (t), R&D:
Assuming zero capital depreciation, installing I(t) =Ż(t) new units of total capital requires spending an amount J(t) = I(t) + 
, where Z(t) is the total capital stock at t, 
represents the Hayashi's internal installation cost, and θ denotes the adjustment-cost parameter. In every period t, nal-good rms choose their investment rate so as to maximize the present discounted value of cash-ows. The current-value Hamiltonian for the optimal control problem is:
where q(t) is the market value of total capital. The corresponding transversality condition is lim t→∞ e −´t 0 r(s)ds · q(t) · Z(t) = 0, where the market interest rate, r(s), equals the cost of capital. At this point, we anticipate the result, to be shown later on, that the economic growth rate, g ≡ g Y , is equal to the investment rate along the BGP, i.e., g = g Z = I(t)/Z(t).
Then, from the rst-order conditions, we have the long-run market value of capital:
This ratio is known as Tobin's (1969) marginal q. With Hayashi's investment cost function, marginal q equals Tobin's average q, the ratio of the market value of the rm to the replacement cost of its total capital stock. This equivalence is important because although it is marginal q that is relevant to investment, only average q is observable.
Intermediate-good rms Intermediate-good m-technology sector consists of a continuum
There is monopolistic competition if we consider the whole sector: the monopolist in industry j m ∈ [0, A m (t)] xes the price p m (j m , t) but faces an isoelastic demand curve, (4) . Intermediate good j is produced with a cost function r(t)K(j, t) = r(t)X(j, t). Along the BGP, the cost of capital will also be constant, i.e., r(t) = r. Prot in j m is thus 
Equation (9) implies that the price charged by intermediate-good producers for their dierentiated goods is equal for all j and H(L)-technology sectors, i.e., it is sector-invariant. Moreover, on the BGP, where r and q will be constant, the markup is both sector-and time-invariant.
Next, using expressions (4) and (9), recalling that in any moment in time we have L = n 0 L(n)dn and H =´1 n H(n)dn, and normalising prices such that:
5 Firms producing dierent quality goods in industry jm are engaged in Bertrand price competition. This assumption makes sure that only varieties of the lowest quality-adjusted price are kept in the market.
Then, if pm(km)/λ < rq, where pm(km) is the price of the top quality and pm(km − 1) = rq due to Bertrand competition, lower grades are unable to provide any eective competition, and the top-quality producer can charge the unconstrained monopoly price. In this case, since the demand function (4) has a price elasticity of −1/(1 − γ), a top-quality rm sets pm(km) = rq/γ, which implies that λ > 1 γ , i.e., innovations are said to be drastic. In contrast, if 1 γ > λ, innovations are non-drastic and the producer of the leading-edge good has to engage in a limit-pricing strategy in order to drive his competitors out of the market, i.e., he/she charges pm(km) = λrq. When nal-good rms are indierent between the top and second-highest goods on the quality ladder (i.e., if 1 γ = λ), they are assumed to purchase the top quality.
we derive the total quantity that each H(L)-technology intermediate-good rm produces and sells, accounting for the threshold nal good n, and resulting prots:
with M = lL, hH, and π 0 ≡ (1 − γ) (rq/χ)
Equilibrium aggregate output Given that the existence of an endogenous threshold reects the idea that the production of nal goods n ∈ [0, n] is more ecient using L-technology, and of nal goods n ∈ [n, 1] is more ecient using H-technology, we can rewrite equation (5) as:
With competitive nal-good producers, L-and the H-technology rms must break even at n. Then, using (13), rewriting price normalisation (10) , and normalising labour such that
, it can be shown that the endogenous nal-good price ratio as a function of n is (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001 ):
where
and
Assuming that the wage per unit of m-type labour equals its marginal product, we use the production function (13) aggregated across n (bearing in mind that´n (t) 0 L(n)dn = L and 1 n(t) H(n)dn = H hold at every t) to derive the high-and low-skilled labour wages:
The skill premium, W H /W L , is then given by the ratio of high-and low-skilled labour wages from (18) :
Finally, using (13) and (15), we can dene equilibrium aggregate output as:
From (20), it is clear that the dynamics of technological knowledge will drive economic growth provided that Vertical R&D Vertical R&D is a standard creative destruction process, with the innovation arrival rate following a Poisson process. By improving on the current top quality level k m (j m , t), a successful vertical R&D rm earns monopoly prots from selling the leading-edge input of k m (j m , t) + 1 quality to nal-good rms. However, temporary exclusive rights over the top-quality intermediate good confer the successful innovator higher prots only for the duration of the patent, which is determined by the instantaneous vertical-innovation arrival rate, I i m (j m , t) = vertical innovation rate at time t, by potential entrant i in industry j m .
The rate I i m (j m , t) is independently distributed across rms, across industries and over time, and depends on the ow of resources R i v,m (j m , t) committed by entrants at time t. As in, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, ch. 7), I i m (j m , t) features constant returns in R&D expen-
where ζ is a constant xed vertical-R&D cost, assumed equal for both sectors m; and the term λ [km(jm,t)+1] 
As the terminal date of each monopoly arrives as a Poisson process with frequency I m (j m , t)
per (innitesimal) increment of time, the present value of a monopolist's prots is a random variable. Let V m (j m , t) and V + m (j m , t) denote the expected value of an incumbent with current quality level k m (j m , t) and k m (j m , t) + 1, respectively. 7 By focusing on the BGP, we take into account that, as will be shown later, P m , r and I are constant over time. We (12) , are constant in-between innovations; hence, we can further write
whereQ m /Q m is also constant on BGP. On the other hand, free-entry prevails in vertical R&D such that the condition
By substituting (23) into (24) and using (12) to simplify, we get the no-arbitrage condition facing a vertical innovator
where the rates of entry are symmetric across industries I m = I m (j m ). After solving equation (22) for R v,m (j m , t) and aggregating across industries j m , we determine optimal total resources devoted to vertical R&D, R v,m (t) =´A m(t) 0 R v,m (j m , t) dj m . As the innovation rate is industry independent, then: 7 Entrants behave as risk neutral agents, and, thus, only care about the expected value of the rm, since
Vm(jm, t) is the perfectly diversied stock-market valuation of the current incumbent in industry j. 
We assume that the cost of setting up a new variety is:
where β 1 > 0 is a constant xed (ow) cost and β 2 > ε. Taking into account the expected quality level (27) and following a similar line of reasoning as in the vertical R&D case, the expected value of a monopolist is (28) simplies to:
Time-dierentiating (30) yields the horizontal R&D no-arbitrage condition:
Intra and inter-sector no-arbitrage conditions Using the above derived vertical and horizontal R&D arbitrage conditions given by equations (25) and (31) respectively, we can now derive the intra-sector arbitrage condition, by equating the eective rate of return, r + I m , m = L, H, for both R&D. This no-arbitrage condition reects the idea that, in equilibrium, the competitive capital market is equally willing to nance vertical and horizontal R&D in each sector m. Thus, using equations (25) and (31), the intra-sector no-arbitrage conditions are:
No-arbitrage conditions, within the H-and L-technology R&D sectors, equate the average cost of horizontal R&D, η m /A m , to the average cost of vertical R&D, ζQ ε mz m .
We must also derive an inter-sector no-arbitrage condition, dening a situation of indierence between, e.g., vertical innovating in L-or H-technology R&D sector. Thus, by equating the eective rate of return for each m = L, H in (25), we get:
8 It will be shown later that the condition β2 > is required for positive economic growth to exist with simultaneous vertical and horizontal R&D along the BGP. 3 The general-equilibrium BGP In this section, we derive and characterise the general-equilibrium interior BGP.
The aggregate nancial wealth held by households is composed by equity of intermediate
From the no-arbitrage condition between vertical and horizontal entry, we have equiv-
Taking time derivatives and comparing with (1), the aggregate ow budget constraint is equivalent to the nal-good market equilibrium condition
The dynamic general equilibrium is dened by the paths of allocations and price distributions ({X m (j m , t), p m (j m , t)} , j m ∈ [0, A m (t)]) t≥0 and of the number of rms, quality indices and vertical-innovation rates ({ A m (t), Q m (t), I m (t)} ) t≥0 for sectors m = L, H, and by the aggregate paths (I(t), C(t), q(t), r(t)) t≥0 , such that: (i) nal-good rms, intermediate-good (iii) the vertical-innovation rates and the nal-good price indices are trendless,
(iv) the growth rates of the quality indices and of the number of varieties are monotonously
(v) the market interest rate and the market value of total capital are trendless, g r = g q = 0. 
Combining this with expressions (14) and (15), after some algebra we obtain:
Equation (36) denes the long-run technological-knowledge bias (Q H /Q L ) * as a function of the relative supply of skills, H/L. This is a common result in the Skill Biased Technological Change (SBTC) literature, reecting the endogeneity of the skill-bias of newly adopted technologies. In fact, recalling expression (25) we can see that the skill structure inuences the direction of technological-knowledge development through two channels. On the one hand, the market-size channel, acting through H(L), increases the innovation rate of H(L)-technology R&D, since an increase in the labour supply broadens the market for the respective technology type. On the other hand, the price channel, acting through P m , reduces the innovation rate of H(L)-technology R&D, i.e., this channel favours developing technologies that complement the relatively scarce type of labour, since the prices for the nal goods that they produce will be higher. Expression (36) shows that the market-size eect dominates the price-channel eect, since the technological-knowledge bias is increasing in the relative supply of skills. Additionally, as (36) shows, (Q H /Q L ) * is directly aected by the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity, φ. This result will be analysed in more detail below.
The skill premium Using equation (35) in (19), the expression for the skill premium becomes:
Equation (37) illustrates the two mechanisms through which changes in the relative supply of skills inuence the skill premium in equilibrium. Initially, an increase in the supply of the H factor reduces the skill premium, which is consistent with the basic producer theory, i.e.
increasing supply reduces prices. This immediate eect is then followed by a change in the opposite direction induced through the technological-knowledge bias. By substituting (36) in (37), we get:
Thus, the long-run skill premium does not depend on the relative supply of skills, H/L, between high-and low-skilled workers an elasticity of substitution close to 2 seems to be the most probable according to the empirical evidence. As (38) shows, the long-run skill premium is determined solely by the productivity advantage ratio of high-to low-skilled labour, h/l (e.g., Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001 ).
The economic growth rate If we assume that the number of industries, A m , is large enough to treat Q m as time-dierentiable and non-stochastic, we can time-dierentiate (6) to getQ m . Then, if β 2 > ε, we can derive another relationship between the growth rate of the quality indices and of the number of varieties,
By applying (39) to the BGP, and by combining it with the BGP condition g * Am = (1 + ε)/(1 + β 2 )g * Qm , we nd that the constraint β 2 > ε is required for (39) to be well dened, Note also that, since ε ≡ (φ − 1) / (1 − α), that condition is equivalent to φ < β 2 · (1 − α) + 1. This upper limit on the parameter that regulates gross substitutability/complementarity, φ, is necessary because of the roundabout eect linking horizontal and vertical R&D: given the distinct nature of vertical and horizontal innovation (immaterial versus physical) and the consequent asymmetry in terms of R&D complexity costs (see (21) and (29) Using the relations presented above, we complete the derivation of the growth rate of the aggregate quality indices, g Qm , and the economic growth rate, g for the BGP. We obtain the following implicit equations for g Qm and g:
and both r * and q * are functions of g * , by (2) and (8), respectively. 9
Next, we analyse the BGP eects on the long-run economic growth rate of shifts in the technological parameters φ, θ and β 2 .
Growth eects of shifts in the technological parameters In order to assess the eects of an increase in the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity, φ, we use the Implicit 
Then we nd that
∂F ∂φ
, also evaluated at the BGP, is:
9 Despite the nonlinearity of (41), there are no multiple general-equilibria interior BGP. To see this, observe that (41) is negatively sloped in the rst quadrant of the space (g, r, q), while (2) and (8) 10 This implies that, at constant prices, the quantity demanded goes up, production increases and output grows faster than it would otherwise.
We now assess the eects of an increase in the horizontal R&D complexity-cost parameter, β 2 , by deriving
, evaluated at the BGP, is:
it follows that ∂F ∂β 2 / ∂F ∂g > 0, and thus ∂g ∂β 2 < 0, i.e., an increase in the horizontal R&D complexity-cost parameter, β 2 , negatively aects the the long-run economic growth rate.
The intuition behind this result is the following. Recalling our horizontal R&D entry cost function, η m (t), we can see that entry costs are higher as a result of an increase in β 2 (see Section 2.3), which makes investments in the creation of new product lines less attractive for the intermediate-good rms. And given that the economic growth rate increases with the aggregate quality index growth rate, which on its turn is positively inuenced by the variety expansion growth rate, the negative eect on g is veried.
Finally, in order to analyse the impact of changes in the adjustment-cost parameter, θ, we determine the sign of
∂F ∂g > 0 and thus ∂g ∂θ < 0, i.e., the long-run economic growth rate is negatively aected by the internal investment costs. The explanation for this result steams directly from the internal investment costs theory. In particular, accounting for capital installation costs in their optimisation problem, rms control their rate of investment (not the capital stock) at each t. Consequently, when internal investment costs increase, i.e. installing new capital becomes more expensive, rms will tend to reduce investment. This will slowdown the accumulation of technological knowledge, leading to a reduction in the economic growth rate.
Long-run technology structure
In order to take our model to the data and, in particular, to quantitatively associate the empirical facts on the technology structure and the skill structure to the complexity costs and the complementarity between technological goods (i.e., the intermediate goods), a task to carry out in Section 5, we need to consider convenient measures of the technology-structure variables.
The long-run technology structure of our model is characterised by the technologicalknowledge bias,(Q H /Q L ) * , the relative intermediate-good production (X H /X L ) * , and the relative number of rms (A H /A L ) * (i.e., H-vis-à-vis L-technology sector). In equation (36),
we show that the technological-knowledge bias is a function of the skill structure, which is characterised by the relative supply of skills, H/L. The same can be proved as regards relative 10 In this sense, the eect of complementarities between technological goods in production is equivalent to increasing returns.
production and the relative number of rms. From the no-arbitrage condition (32) and taking into account equation (36), we derive the relative number of rms:
where:
From the expressions for X L and X H (obtained by aggregating (11)) and (36), we get relative production as:
However, since we wish to confront our theoretical results with the data on production for a number of countries and the data is presented in a quality-adjusted base by the national statistics oces (see, e.g., Eurostat, 2001), we nd it convenient to compute production also in quality-adjusted terms. Reiterating the steps as in Section 2.2, we nd total intermediate- (48) and (50), we consider the following quality-adjusted measure of relative production:
In the above equations, we used the fact that, on the BGP, the skill premium relates oneto-one to the absolute productivity advantage of high-over low-skilled labour h/l (see (38)), in order to replace the latter with W H /W L . Thus, we see that, according to the model, two types of eects determine the cross-country behaviour of the technology structure depicted by Figure 2 in the Appendix: the market-size eect, through which a higher proportion of highskilled workers is associated with technological change directed towards the high-tech sectors and the skill-premium eect, reecting the absolute productivity advantage of high-skilled workers.
Anticipating the empirical results detailed in Section 5, we focus on the conditions under which: (i) the elasticities D 0 and D 1 are positive and (ii) D 0 < D 1 . As already shown in Section 2.3, given the constraints φ > α and β 2 > ε, ε ≡ (φ − 1) / (1 − α), we have β 2 > −1 and thus D 0 > 0. On the other hand, the constraint β 2 > ε ⇔ φ < β 2 ·(1−α)+1 is sucient for both D 1 > 0 and D 0 < D 1 to be satised (the former inequality is equivalent to φ < β 2 +1+α and the latter to φ < β 2 +1). Thus, when the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity, φ, is compatible with BGP economic growth both along an intensive and an extensive margin (see Section 3), it also implies a positive elasticity of both technology-structure variables the relative number of rms and relative production with respect to the skill structure and the skill premium, as observed in the data. Moreover, an elasticity of relative production larger than that of the relative number of rms reects the fact that the vertical-innovation mechanism ultimately commands the horizontal entry dynamics, meaning that a BGP with increasingly costly horizontal R&D occurs only because entrants expect the incumbency value to grow propelled by quality-enhancing R&D. This mechanism generates a roundabout eect that amplies the impact of the market-size channel on relative (quality-adjusted) production, when compared to the impact on the relative number of rms.
Estimation and calibration
The degree of complementarity, horizontal R&D complexity cost, and the markup We now turn to a quantitative assessment of the model and investigate how important our analytical mechanism may be in accounting for the cross-country pattern in the distribution of rms and production between high-and low-tech sectors. Although it should be clear that our mechanism does not account for all the variation in the technology structure across countries, we abstract from all other potential sources of variation. Thus, this exercise provides an upper bound on how much of the referred to cross-country dierences can be explained by the variation in the skill structure. Then, given the estimated eect of the skill structure on the technology structure, we establish the implicit estimate of the horizontal R&D complexity-cost parameter, β 2 , and thereby of the degree of complementarity between technological goods, φ.
In particular, we are interested in checking whether the case of φ > 1, which features as a key assumption in the theoretical literature that studies poverty traps, growth and business cycles based on the mechanism of gross complementarity in technological goods (e.g., Matsuyama, 1995; Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996; Evans et al., 1998), has empirical support, by using recent cross-country data on the technology structure (i.e., relative production and the relative number of rms) and the skill structure (i.e., the relative supply of skills).
11 Recall, from Section 2, that the only assumption on φ imposed by our theoretical model is φ > α, with 0 < α < 1, such that either gross substitutability (φ < 1) or gross complementarity (φ > 1) may arise a priori.
We adopt the following strategy. Firstly, we consider equations (48) and (51) to get:
Then, based on (53) and (54), we run the regressions:
where e i , i = 0, 1, are the error terms, to get the estimatesD 01 ,D 02 ,D 11 , andD 12 . 12 Table   1 reports the OLS estimates of the coecients in regressions (55) Table 2. 11 See the Appendix for more details on the data.
12 The log-log relationships arising from our BGP results for the relative number of rms and for relative production (equations (53) and (54)) have no intercept, in contrast to the regression equations (55) and (56). We can easily modify our model in order to have a non-zero intercept in (53) and (54), by considering heterogeneous ow xed costs of R&D across L-and H -technology sectors in (22) and (28) As D 0 is a function of β 2 and D 1 is a function of (α, φ, β 2 ), we let α = 0.4, as usual in the literature, and then use the condence intervals for D 0 and D 1 to get the implicit condence intervals for (φ, β 2 ). Figure 1 juxtaposes the condence intervals for φ and β 2 , together with the subset of values in space (φ, β 2 ) that results from the constraint β 2 > ε, ε ≡ (φ − 1) / (1 − α). Our calculations show values for β 2 between 0.22 and 1.30 and for φ between 1.08 and 1.78. 13 The fact that we get a condence interval with positive values for β 2 indicates that the elasticity regulating the horizontal-R&D complexity costs is larger than the one in the vertical-R&D case (i.e., β 2 + 1 > 1), in line with what should be expected bearing in mind the distinct nature of the two types of R&D. On the other hand, since our estimates of φ are larger than unity, our identication and estimation exercise suggests that there is gross complementarity between technological goods in production, thus supporting the key complementarity assumption appearing in the theoretical literature mentioned earlier.
However, it is also noteworthy that, according to our exercise, calibrated values of φ as high as 4, as found in the literature (e.g., Evans et al., 1998; Thompson, 2008) , seem to lack empirical support Figure 1 makes clear that this observation is true irrespective of the constraint β 2 > ε ⇔ φ < β 2 · (1 − α) + 1.
13 Notice that, even though the goodness of t of the regressions in Table 1 might most likely increase if we added explanatory variables, the approach followed herein reects the fact that the log-log linear relationships between the technology-structure variables, the skill premium and the relative supply of skills have an exact analytical counterpart in terms of the BGP equilibrium of the model, as already shown.
We take advantage of this fact to pursue an identication and estimation strategy for the key technology parameters using the empirical results on the technology-structure variables presented in Table 1 . Table 2 (dashed lines). The bold line depicts the boundary in space (φ, β 2 ) imposed by the constraint β 2 > ε, ε ≡ (φ − 1) / (1 − α). α = 0.4.
[ Figure 1 goes about here]
Finally, something may be said about our estimates of the markup, since, recalling (9) and that γ = α/φ is imposed to ensure constant returns to scale, we are able to compute γ at the expense of φ. Sensitivity of Tobin-q to technology parameters We are also interested in the long-run relationship between the Tobin-q and both the degree of complementarity between technology goods, φ, and the complexity eect pertaining to horizontal R&D, β 2 , through the impact of the last two factors on the long-run economic growth rate. We focus on the extreme values of the condence intervals for φ and β 2 depicted by Figure 1 , such that four scenarios are analysed corresponding to four dierent pairs (φ, β 2 ). Table 3 on the markup with our estimates of the degree of complementarity, we consider the case of non-drastic innovations, the one that seems to be more common in practice, such that the markup is given by 1/χ = λ < 1/γ; then, bearing in mind the average estimate of the markup in Nurrbin (1993) and Basu and Fernald (2002) , we let λ = 1.4. Finally, the values of the parameters θ, β 1 and ζ are chosen in order to calibrate the BGP aggregate growth rate, g * , around 3.4 percent/year on average across scenarios (see Table 3 ), which corresponds to the average growth rate of the cross-country sample in the Appendix. Then, the implied average value for the real interest rate, r * , is 7.2 percent, in line with the empirical value for the longrun average real return on the stock market, and which should be taken as the equilibrium rate of return to R&D, as argued by Jones and Williams (2000) .
[ , takes values between −0.28 and −1.72, as depicted by Table 3 . It is noteworthy that E q φ is always greater than unity, meaning that a shift in the degree of gross complementarity between technological goods, φ, has a more than proportional eect on the long-run market value of capital (i.e., there is an elastic relationship). In turn, a change in the complexity eect pertaining to horizontal R&D, β 2 , which may also be interpreted as a measure of the barriers to entry through R&D activities, also induces a more than proportional (negative) eect on the long-run market value of capital, but only if the complementarity degree is large enough.
A strong positive relationship between the Tobin-q and the R&D and technology characteristics of the rms has been frequently reported by the empirical literature (e.g., Chan et al., 1990; Hall, 1999; Connolly and Hirschey, 2005 ). This result is apparently supported by our estimation and calibration exercise, which, however, also suggests that it is important to distinguish between the technological determinants of the long-run market value of capital and explicitly analyse their interaction.
Concluding remarks
This paper builds an endogenous growth model of directed technical change with simultaneous vertical and horizontal R&D, internal costly investment and gross substitutability/complementarity between technological goods, with a view to identify and quantify the long-run link between: (i) the technology structure and the skill structure, by considering an explicit role for the degree of complementarity between technological goods; (ii) the Tobin-q and the technology characteristics of the rms through the impact of the latter on the long-run economic growth rate. By solving the model for the BGP equilibrium, we show that it entails an analytical mechanism that is consistent with the observed cross-country pattern in the technology structure.
Then, based on the analytical BGP relationships derived in the model and on the cross-country data for the technology structure and the skill structure, we compute indirect estimates of the value of the parameters that regulate the degree of gross substitutability/complementarity and the complexity costs pertaining to horizontal R&D. In particular, our identication and estimation exercise suggests that there is gross complementarity between technological goods, thus supporting the key complementarity assumption appearing in the theoretical literature.
Furthermore, a strong relationship between the Tobin-q and the R&D and technology characteristics of the rms is obtained, in line with the related empirical literature.
The study of the transitional dynamics should be pursued in future work. The qualitative characterisation of the local dynamics properties might allow one to nd to what extent variations in a country's initial conditions lead to non-monotonic time paths of the technology structure and the economic growth rate towards the BGP in face of a shock in the skill structure, as observed in the 80s and 90s in a number of developed countries. Moreover, this will allow us to accommodate the fact that the time-span of the available data is relatively short and hence may entail transitional dynamics eects. 
